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# One Vendor's Script Reached 178 Big Websites. Five Caribbean Cyber Registers Carry Nothing On It.
- URL: https://www.lacaribenanews.com/optimizely-script-178-organisations-caribbean-cirt-silence-2026/
- Published: 2026-11-17T18:08:09.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-17T18:08:11.000Z
- Description: Researchers at Report URI found malicious code being served through Optimizely, a website testing service, on 16 November 2026. It ran on the pages of 178 organisations, among them Zoom, Salesforce, CNN, HSBC and IKEA, each of which had embedded that service.
- Author: Theon Alleyne
- Tags: Cybersecurity, Caribbean, Vendors, Business, MSME: indirect

**Quick summary:** Researchers at Report URI found malicious code being served through Optimizely, a website testing service, on 16 November 2026\. It ran on the pages of 178 organisations, among them Zoom, Salesforce, CNN, HSBC and IKEA, each of which had embedded that service. Five Caribbean cyber registers carry nothing on it.

By LCN Business Desk

On Monday the websites of Zoom, CNN and IKEA were serving code that tried to steal from the people reading them.

All three had agreed to load the same piece of software from an outside supplier. Somebody tampered with it, and that was enough to reach every visitor they had.

## What happened, and how far did it reach?

Attackers got into a website testing service, and it carried their code to 188 scripts across 178 organisations.

Optimizely sells software that lets a business test different versions of its own website. A customer embeds its script, and the script runs in the browser of everyone who visits. Attackers got into that service instead of going after each site. Once the tampered software loaded, malicious code could appear on the customer's site, and a visitor could be affected by opening the page.

Researchers at the security firm Report URI [identified it on Monday](https://www.newsweek.com/cyber-attack-websites-affected-12725863?ref=lacaribenanews.com). Optimizely said the following day that it had fixed the problem and removed the malicious code.

The reach was weighted towards the industries that hold money.

| Category                    | Organisations | Among them                         |
| --------------------------- | ------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| Banking and finance         | 32            | HSBC, Equifax, ABN AMRO, Paychex   |
| Technology and software     | 23            | Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Tableau  |
| Retail and fashion          | 20            | IKEA, ASOS, Mattel, American Eagle |
| Streaming and entertainment | 12            | Peacock, Starz, SeaWorld           |
| News and media              | 10            | CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR            |
| Airlines and travel         | 9             | Alaska Airlines, KLM               |

*Affected organisations by sector. Report URI, as reported by Newsweek.*

The list runs on past those six into healthcare, telecoms, insurance, logistics and education. One supplier sat inside the browsing session of customers in nearly every industry at once, and a single change to its code reached all of them on the same day.

## What was the code taking, and how much went with it?

Nobody knows. One day's cryptocurrency trail came to about US$7,040, and that is the only part anyone can count.

It was built to swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses that a user copied, so a payment would go somewhere else. It attempted to take credit card details and information stored in browsers. It captured screenshots. It also tried older Apple operating systems on iPhones and iPads.

Only one of those leaves a public record. Cryptocurrency moves on a ledger anyone can read, which is why a figure exists for it at all, and the figure covers a single day. Stolen card numbers, browser passwords and screenshots leave no such trail, so there is no number for them and may never be one. Investigators have not established how many people were affected.

## Did 178 companies serve attacker code to their own visitors?

Yes. What is not established is how much it took from any of them.

Each of the 178 had chosen to embed the service, so the code ran on their own pages, from their own domains, carrying whatever trust a visitor extends to the name in the address bar.

Newsweek reports the finding does not show hackers broke into all 178 companies' own systems, or took information from everyone who visited, and that it "remains unclear how many people, if any, had their personal or financial information stolen". Opening a website does not by itself mean data was taken.

Those are limits on the proven damage. They are not limits on the exposure, and the exposure was a decision each organisation made when it put someone else's script on its page.

## Has any Caribbean agency said anything?

Not on the five published registers checked on 17 November 2026.

[The Guyana National CIRT](https://cirt.gy/?ref=lacaribenanews.com) is publishing currently, and carries vendor advisories: three went up in a single day covering Red Hat, IBM and Dell. None concerns this incident. [Trinidad and Tobago's TT-CSIRT](https://ttcsirt.gov.tt/?ref=lacaribenanews.com) shows nothing on it, and the most recent dates on its front page are September and October. CARICOM IMPACS and the Dominican Republic's CNCS show nothing on it either. Jamaica's JaCIRT register was not available, so Jamaica is not among the five.

The Bahamas team, CIRT-BS, was publishing on the day itself. [Its alerts page](https://www.cirt.bs/?ref=lacaribenanews.com) carries an item dated 16 November 2026, a recap of CyberSharks, the national capture-the-flag competition it ran for Bahamian students aged 13 to 17 in October. Nothing on the page concerns Optimizely.

A Caribbean team does issue threat warnings without waiting for a local victim, and that one has. [The National Computer Incident Response Team of The Bahamas issued an Akira ransomware alert on 22 October 2026, naming no confirmed attack at home](https://www.lacaribenanews.com/bahamas-cirt-akira-ransomware-advisory-caribbean-smes-2026/).

## How often has this happened this month?

Twice in five days a global failure has drawn no Caribbean advisory.

[Microsoft's servers failed on 12 November and the FAA stopped every United States departure on the 13th](https://www.lacaribenanews.com/microsoft-faa-chase-united-outages-caribbean-latin-america-exposure-2026/). Chase and United followed on the 16th. Argentina's banks published an all-clear. No Caribbean body said anything. This is the second.

The region also had its own incident in the same stretch, and there the affected body did speak. [The Santos Port Authority confirmed on 10 November 2026 that its systems were hit and said it could not yet determine the extent or whether data was accessed](https://www.lacaribenanews.com/porto-de-santos-cyberattack-virus-predated-power-cut-protection-level-two-2026/).

## Does the region already have this exact problem?

It has it this week, in its own airline.

[Caribbean Airlines says booking data was taken through its reservations provider, Amadeus](https://www.lacaribenanews.com/caribbean-airlines-amadeus-breach-trinidad-no-notification-duty-jamaica-72-hours-2026/). The shape is the same as Optimizely: the airline was not the way in, its supplier was. Trinidad and Tobago owns 88 per cent of the airline and its Data Protection Act carries no breach notification duty.

So the region is not waiting to find out whether a vendor compromise can reach it. It is waiting to find out who has to tell anyone when it does.

## What should a Caribbean business do about its own website?

Find out what its own pages load, because that is the exposure.

A hotel booking page, a credit union portal, a shop's storefront: each loads scripts the business did not write, for analytics, chat, adverts or payments. Being absent from a list of 178 is not evidence of safety. It means a different supplier, on a different day.

An owner can establish three things without a consultant: which third-party scripts the site loads, who controls each one, and whether a change to any of them would be noticed within a day. Not one of the three requires an advisory from anybody.

<!-- archive: oped-business-community-silence-guyana-2026 | read it: it is an opinion piece about the Guyanese business community staying silent on a domestic matter. The shared word is silence. It carries nothing on cybersecurity, on vendors or on incident response, and the two uses of the word have nothing in common. -->

### Entities

\- **Optimizely**: the website testing vendor whose service attackers used to serve malicious code. - **Report URI**: the security firm that identified the affected scripts on 16 November 2026\. - **Guyana National CIRT**: the Guyanese computer incident response team, which publishes vendor advisories. - **TT-CSIRT**: the Trinidad and Tobago Cyber Security Incident Response Team. - **National Computer Incident Response Team of The Bahamas**: the Bahamian team that issued an Akira ransomware alert on 22 October 2026\. - **Amadeus**: the reservations provider through which Caribbean Airlines says booking data was taken.

### What the title card shows

\- Scripts affected: 188, across 178 organisations. - Vendor: Optimizely, a website testing service. - Identified by: Report URI, on 16 November 2026\. - Cryptocurrency traced to linked wallets on 16 November 2026: about US$7,040\. That is one day's public ledger trail and the only countable part, not the extent of the loss. - Largest affected category: banking and finance, 32 organisations. - Caribbean advisories on this incident: none on the five registers checked on 17 November 2026, those of Guyana's National CIRT, TT-CSIRT, CARICOM IMPACS, the Dominican Republic's CNCS and the Bahamas' CIRT-BS. Jamaica's register was not available. - What the code ran on: the organisations' own pages, from their own domains. Whether hackers also entered their own systems, and how much was taken from any site, is not established. - Sources: Newsweek on Report URI's findings; the published advisory pages of Guyana's National CIRT, TT-CSIRT, CARICOM IMPACS and the Dominican Republic's CNCS; La Caribena News reporting of 24 October and 10, 11 and 17 November 2026.

## Frequently asked questions

What is the Optimizely incident?

Attackers exploited a website testing service and used it to serve malicious code to sites that embed its script. Report URI identified 188 affected scripts across 178 organisations on 16 November 2026.

Did the companies' own systems get broken into?

Not on this evidence, and that is a separate question from what their websites served. The code ran on their own pages because they had embedded the script. How many people had data taken remains unclear.

What was the code designed to do?

Swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses copied by a user, attempt to take credit card details and browser-stored information, capture screenshots, and target older Apple operating systems on iPhones and iPads.

Has a Caribbean cyber agency issued an advisory on it?

Not on the five registers checked on 17 November 2026\. Guyana's National CIRT is publishing vendor advisories currently and has nothing on this one. The Bahamas' CIRT-BS published on 16 November 2026, and the item was an event recap. Jamaica's register was not available, so Jamaica is not among the five.

What can a business do without waiting for an advisory?

Establish which third-party scripts its website loads, who controls each one, and whether a change to any of them would be noticed within a day.